DELAWARE DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES:
THE FOCUS ON LOYALTY
Randy J. Holland*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The University of Pennsylvania has had an illustrious reputation ever
since it was founded in 1749 by Benjamin Franklin 1 and the Law School
was established in 1850 by Professor George Sharswood. 2 As I prepared
for my lecture today, however, I was keenly aware that the first lectures in
the law delivered at the University of Pennsylvania were in 1790. 3 Those
law lectures were presented by James Wilson, a signer of the Declaration of
Independence and a Justice on the first United States Supreme Court. 4 In
fact, Wilson’s views on the law were presented in lectures to President
George Washington and the members of his Cabinet. 5
Penn’s tradition of academic excellence continues. The Institute for
Law and Economics (the “Institute”) 6 is a good example. For more than
twenty-five years it has demonstrated the benefits of a cross-disciplinary
perspective. As Dean Michael Fitts has stated, the Institute “combines
Penn’s greatest strengths in the Law School, the Wharton School, and the
Department of Economics to focus on complex questions that concern all

* Randy J. Holland is a Justice on the Supreme Court of Delaware. This is the 2008
Distinguished Jurist Lecture that he presented for the Institute for Law and Economics at the
University of Pennsylvania School of Law on November 11, 2008.
1. Timeline of University History, University Archives and Records Center,
University
of
Pennsylvania,
available
at
http://www.archives.upenn.edu/histy/genlhistory/timeline.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
2. History of the Law School, University Archives and Records Center, University of
Pennsylvania, available at http://www.archives.upenn.edu/histy/features/schools/law.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See University of Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law & Economics,
http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/ile/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2009) (describing
the Institute).
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of these fields.” 7 Two of the great strengths in the Law School are the codirectors of the Institute, Professors Edward B. Rock and Michael L.
Wachter. I congratulate them on the Institute’s remarkable achievements
and thank them for honoring me with the invitation to speak today.
Ed Rock is not only one of the most respected professors of corporate
law in the United States but he has a well-deserved international reputation.
More than a decade ago, he wrote a brilliant law review article entitled
Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work? 8 He
concluded that Delaware fiduciary law is best understood as a set of
parables or folktales of good and bad managers and directors. According to
Professor Rock, the tales that are told in the Delaware judicial opinions
collectively describe the role of directors.
I must admit that when I first read the title, I thought Professor Rock
would cast the Delaware judiciary in the role of “saints” with the litigants
playing the “sinners.” In that article, Professor Rock concludes that the
Delaware judges on the Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery are good
storytellers and notwithstanding “the fact specific, narrative quality of
Delaware judicial opinions, over time [those decisions] yield reasonably
determinative guidelines.” 9
In reaching that conclusion, Professor Rock successfully asks,
analyzes, and answers several questions, including what he describes as
“the mushiness of Delaware fiduciary duty case law.” 10 Because I
graduated from this law school, I immediately recognized “mushiness” as a
sophisticated legal term of art. Consequently, just like a law student
writing an exam answer, I knew I could not leave the title of my speech
with a mushy reference to fiduciary duty. So, I amended the title to include
a “focus on loyalty.” In my remarks this afternoon, I will briefly describe
why loyalty is now the central theme in the Delaware judiciary’s stories or
opinions about the fiduciary duties of directors.
I am sure that when most of you think of legal stories, the opinions by
the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery are not foremost in
your mind. Instead, you may think of literature about the law such as To
Kill a Mockingbird, 11 Twelve Angry Men, 12 The Caine Mutiny 13 or novels
7. INSTITUTE FOR LAW & ECONOMICS, 2006-2007 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2007), available
at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/ile/AnnualReports/20062007AnnualReport.pdf.
8. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997).
9. Id. at 1017.
10. Id. at 1101.
11. HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (J.B. Lippincott Co. 1960) (telling the story
of a lawyer from a small town in Alabama who decides to defend an unpopular client).
12. REGINALD ROSE, TWELVE ANGRY MEN, A PLAY IN THREE ACTS (Dramatic Publ’g.
Co. 1955) (portraying the story of a dissenting juror in a murder trial).
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by John Grisham. 14 You may also think of movies such as A Civil
Action, 15 Kramer vs. Kramer 16 or perhaps, given the topic of my remarks,
Wall Street 17 with Michael Douglas as Gordon Gekko.
You may also think of Shakespeare because Shakespeare often
referred to the law in his plays. The persuasiveness of legal references by
Shakespeare is understandable. London was home to the four Inns of
Court. They were the institutions that trained trial lawyers—known in
England as barristers.
Many historians contend that Shakespeare had extensive contact with
the legal world of London. Seven of Shakespeare’s plays were performed
at the Inns of Court. 18 The Merchant of Venice 19 and Measure for
Measure 20 were Shakespeare’s two primarily “legal” plays. From a legal
perspective, there are parallel themes in both plays: the tension between
justice and the letter of the law. In the end, both plays temper a strictly
legalistic approach with equitable principles. We all remember that
Shylock was entitled to his pound of flesh—as long as he did not draw any
blood. 21
The Merchant of Venice is often viewed as dramatizing the struggle of
the Court of Chancery in England for the supremacy of its equity
jurisdiction. 22 Interestingly, the Delaware Constitution of 1792 created a
separate court of equity that still exists. 23 The equitable struggles described
by Shakespeare are relevant today because the Delaware Court of Chancery
has been vested with all of the historic equitable powers that were extant in

13. HERMAN WOUK, THE CAINE MUTINY, A NOVEL OF WORLD WAR II (Doubleday
1952) (detailing the story of a naval captain who is discharged by his executive officer).
14. See generally John Grisham, Author Spotlight, Random House, Inc. Academic
Resources, http://www.randomhouse.com/acmart/catalog/
author.pperl?authorid=11178&view=full_sptlght (last visited Feb. 23, 2009) (outlining John
Grisham’s career as an author).
15. A CIVIL ACTION (Touchstone Pictures 1998) (relaying the story of families that filed
suit against two companies that dumped toxic waste and caused their children’s deaths).
16. KRAMER VS. KRAMER (Columbia Pictures 1979) (telling the story of a divorced man
who must fight in court for the custody of his child).
17. WALL STREET (Amercent Films 1987) (depicting the story of a young stock broker
and his ordeal with illegal insider trading).
18. See DANIEL J. KORNSTEIN, KILL ALL THE LAWYERS? SHAKESPEARE’S LEGAL APPEAL
13-15 (Princeton Univ. Press 1994) (explaining the role of the law in Shakespeare’s works).
19. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE (telling the story of a merchant
who must default on his loan for his friend’s love).
20. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE (portraying the story of the Duke
of Vienna’s absence that left the strict Angelo in charge).
21. SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, supra note 19, at act 4, sc. 1.
22. KORNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 65-66 (discussing the legal references in
Shakespeare’s book, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE).
23. DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VI, § 1.
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England’s Court of Chancery prior to the American Revolutionary War. 24
The Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court have
repeatedly tempered a strictly legalistic approach with equitable principles.
As the Delaware Supreme Court stated in Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Industries—“inequitable action does not become permissible simply
because it is legally possible.” 25
“One of the fundamental tenets of Delaware corporate law provides
for a separation of control and ownership.” 26 What has been called a
“cardinal precept” of the Delaware General Corporation Law’s statutory
scheme is the provision in section 141(a) that “directors, rather than
shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation.” 27
Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law states in pertinent
part:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter
or in its certificate of incorporation. 28
For more than a century, Delaware courts have tempered law with
equity by recognizing that the directors’ exercise of this statutory power to
manage “carries with it certain fundamental fiduciary obligations to the
corporation and its shareholders.” 29 “An underlying premise for the
imposition of fiduciary duties is a separation of legal control from
beneficial ownership.” 30 Equitable principles act in those circumstances to
protect the stockholder beneficiaries who are not in a position to directly
manage the corporation for themselves.
It should come as no surprise that the fiduciary duties of directors of
Delaware corporations are an equitable response to the power that is
conferred upon directors as a matter of statutory law. It should also come
as no surprise that those equitable fiduciary duty precepts date back to a
decision by the Lord Chancellor of England in 1742. In Charitable Corp.
v. Sutton, the Lord Chancellor explained that corporate directors were both
agents and trustees required to act with “fidelity and reasonable
24. See RANDY J. HOLLAND, THE DELAWARE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 133-35 (Greenwood Press 2002) (discussing the jurisdiction and decision process of
the Court of Chancery); see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983)
(explaining that the Delaware Court of Chancery has the right to determine fair value during
appraisal under § 262).
25. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
26. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998).
27. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
141(a) (2008) (stating same).
28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
29. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811 (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)).
30. Malone, 722 A.2d at 9.
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diligence.” 31 Ever since the Sutton decision, courts have consistently stated
that directors of corporations are fiduciaries who must comply with the
duties of care (described as reasonable diligence in the Sutton decision) and
loyalty (described as fidelity in Sutton). 32
II.

BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

Corporate litigation usually involves a shareholder challenge to a
board of directors’ business decision. Shareholder lawsuits frequently seek
monetary damages for financial harm that was allegedly caused by the
directors’ actions. “Stockholders can enforce directors’ fiduciary duties
through either a direct suit on behalf of that stockholder, where there is
damage personal to that stockholder, or through a derivative suit to enforce
the directors’ duties on behalf of the corporation.” 33
Delaware courts are aware that shareholder investments will only be
maximized if disinterested directors carefully act in good faith to assess the
relative risks and rewards of business matters. 34 Delaware courts also
recognize, however, that boards of directors would never pursue a rational
but risky business strategy, in an effort to increase shareholder wealth, if
financial failure would automatically result in their own personal monetary
liability. 35
It is inevitable that some business decisions will not result in financial
success, even though the directors properly discharged all of their fiduciary
duties. 36 That brings me to the business judgment rule. The business
judgment rule seeks to promote the full and free exercise of the statutory
managerial power granted to Delaware directors while at the same time
protecting the legitimate expectation of shareholder investors. 37
The business judgment rule also traces its origins to the 1742 decision
of the Lord Chancellor in Charitable Corp. v. Sutton. 38 In that decision,
31. Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 406, 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 645 (Ch. 1742); see
also Marcia M. McMurray, A Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of
Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605, 605 nn.1-2 (1987)
(explaining Charitable Corp. v. Sutton’s description of directors as both agents and trustees).
32. Constance Frisby Fain, Corporate Director and Officer Liability, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 417, 419-20 (1996).
33. Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a
Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 400 (2007)
(citing DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1).
34. Randy J. Holland, An Introduction to Delaware Corporation Law Directors’
Fiduciary Duties, 19 CIV. & COM. L.J. 92, 97 (2008) (Taiwan).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981) (describing
the business judgment rule as a standard to review director decisions).
38. Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch. 1742).
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the Lord Chancellor of England expressed the court’s reluctance to second
guess the business decisions of corporate directors and articulated what is
considered to be the first pronouncement of the business judgment rule. 39
The Lord Chancellor wrote:
[Directors] are most properly agents to those who employ them
in this trust, and who empower them to direct and superintend the
affairs of the corporation. In this respect they may be guilty of
acts of commission or omission, of mal-feasance or nonfeasance. Now where acts are executed within their authority, . .
. though attended with bad consequences, it will be very difficult
to determine that these are breaches of trust. For it is by no
means just in a judge, after bad consequences have arisen from
such executions of their power, to say that they foresaw at the
time what must necessarily happen; and therefore were guilty of
a breach of trust. 40
Delaware amended its Constitution in 1897 to permit incorporation
under general law and enacted the General Corporation statute in 1899.
The Delaware Court of Chancery began to adjudicate disputes involving
the internal affairs of corporations incorporated in Delaware. 41 Because the
Chancellor—as opposed to a jury—would hear and resolve disputes before
the Court of Chancery, a body of case law began to develop as the
Chancellor wrote opinions explaining his reasoning. 42
The idea that directors of Delaware corporations owed fiduciary duties
to the stockholders was probably first expressed in Bodell v. General Gas
& Electric Corp., a 1926 decision of the Court of Chancery that was
affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court. 43 Chancellor James L. Wolcott
wrote that “[t]here is no rule better settled in the law of corporations than
that directors in their conduct of the corporation stand in the situation of

39. 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 9 (5th ed. 1998 & Supp.
2002).
40. Sutton, 2 Atk. at 405, 26 Eng. Rep. at 644 (citations omitted).
41. Donald F. Parsons Jr. & Joseph R. Slights III, The History of Delaware’s Business
Courts: Their Rise to Preeminence, BUS. L. TODAY, March/April 2008, at 21, 22
(describing the role of the Delaware Court of Chancery).
42. Id. at 22. The position of Chancellor was established in the Delaware Constitution
of 1792. The Chancellor remained the sole judge of the Court of Chancery under the
Delaware Constitution of 1897. In 1939, the Delaware legislature created the position of
vice chancellor. Today, there is one Chancellor and there are four vice chancellors. Id. at
21-22.
43. See generally Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 132 A. 442 (Del. Ch. 1926), aff’d,
140 A.2d 264 (Del. 1927) (recognizing that directors owed a fiduciary duty to the
stockholders); see also Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the
Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 981-82 (1994) (detailing the
evolution of director fiduciary duty).
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fiduciaries” and, while “not trustees in the strict sense of the term, . . . they
have often been described as such” for convenience. 44
In 1931, building on Bodell, the Court of Chancery “articulated what it
considered the elemental requirements for invoking the Delaware business
judgment rule—good faith and a ‘bona fide[]’ purpose.” 45 In Cole v.
National Cash Credit Ass’n, Chancellor Wolcott stated that “[t]here is a
presumption that the judgment of the governing body of a corporation . . .
is formed in good faith and inspired by a bona fide[] purpose.” 46 The court
explained the underlying premise of the rule by referencing Professor
Thompson’s textbook Works on Corporations, which used language similar
to the 1742 decision in Sutton:
Courts of equity . . . cannot be called upon to control the
discretion of the managing bodies of corporations; otherwise,
they would be choked with applications of recalcitrant
stockholders. The action of a board of directors may be illadvised or apparently unprofitable, but this furnishes no ground
for invoking the restraining powers of the court. 47
In 1984, the Delaware Supreme Court refined the business judgment
rule in what is now a seminal case—Aronson v. Lewis. 48 In Aronson, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the business judgment rule “is a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the company.” 49 A
hallmark of the business judgment rule is that a court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the board if the latter’s decision “can be attributed to
any rational business purpose.” 50
The directors of Delaware corporations stand in a fiduciary
relationship not only to the stockholders, but also to the corporations upon
whose boards they serve. The directors’ fiduciary responsibilities to both
the corporation and its shareholders have frequently been described as a
“triad”: due care, loyalty, and good faith. 51

44. Bodell, 132 A. at 446.
45. Horsey, supra note 43, at 984 (citing Cole v. Nat’l Cash Credit Ass’n, 156 A. 183,
188 (Del. Ch. 1931)).
46. Cole, 156 A. at 188; see also Horsey, supra note 43, at 984.
47. Cole, 156 A.2d at 188 (quoting Donald v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 48 A.2d 786,
788 (N.J. Ch. 1901), rev’d, 48 A.2d 771 (N.J. 1901)); see also Horsey, supra note 43, at
984-85.
48. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
49. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del.
Ch. 1971); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Corp., 126 A.2d 46, 49 (Del. Ch. 1924)
(reaffirming the view in Aronson).
50. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
51. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“good faith may be described
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“The business judgment rule ‘operates as both a procedural guide for
litigants and as a substantive rule of law.’” 52 “As a procedural guide, the
business judgment presumption is a rule of evidence that places the initial
burden of proof on the plaintiff.” 53 To rebut the presumptive applicability
of the business judgment rule, a shareholder plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the board of directors, in reaching its challenged decision,
violated one of its fiduciary responsibilities: due care, loyalty, or good
faith. 54
If a shareholder plaintiff fails to meet this evidentiary burden, the
business judgment rule operates to provide substantive protection for the
directors and for the decisions that they have made. 55 “If a plaintiff
successfully rebuts the business judgment rule, the burden then shifts to the
defendant directors to prove that the transaction was fair to the
stockholders.” 56 The directors must show that “the transaction was the
product of fair dealing and fair price.” 57
Although the fiduciary duties of a Delaware director are unremitting,
the exact course of conduct that must be followed to properly discharge
their responsibilities “will change in the specific context of the action the
director is taking with regard to either the corporation or its
shareholders.” 58 To understand the fiduciary duties of directors today, in
particular, the focus on loyalty, we must examine the evolution of
Delaware’s jurisprudence regarding directors’ responsibilities to act with
colloquially as part of a ‘triad’ of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and
loyalty”); see also Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate
Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV.
701, 742 (2008) (“A modern understanding of Delaware director fiduciary duties normally
begins with the Delaware Supreme Court’s view in the 1993 Cede case . . . that collectively
treated good faith, loyalty, and due care as the ‘triads’ of fiduciary duty”) (citing Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
52. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995) (emphasis
omitted) (citing Cede, 634 A.2d at 360; Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,
1374 (Del. 1995)).
53. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1162 (emphasis omitted).
54. Cede, 634 A.2d at 361.
55. If the presumption of the business judgment rule is rebutted, however, the burden
shifts to the director defendants to prove that the challenged transaction was “entirely fair”
to the shareholder plaintiffs. Burden shifting does not create per se or automatic liability on
the part of the directors. An initial judicial determination that a given breach of a board’s
fiduciary duties has rebutted the presumption of the business judgment rule does not
preclude a subsequent judicial determination that the board of directors’ action was entirely
fair. See Cede, 634 A.2d at 361 (stating “[i]f the rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the
defendant directors, the proponents of the challenged transaction, to prove to the trier of fact
the ‘entire fairness’ of the transaction to the shareholder plaintiff.” (citing Nixon v.
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1377 (Del. 1993)).
56. Grossman, supra note 33, at 401 (citing Cede, 634 A.2d at 361).
57. Id.
58. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (1998).
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care, loyalty, and good faith. We will do that by reviewing several wellknown Delaware corporate decisions or stories.
A.

Duty of Loyalty

The fiduciary duty of loyalty as a concept in Delaware corporation law
has been traced back to Guth v. Loft, in which the Delaware Supreme Court
held that “[c]orporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their
position of trust and confidence to further their private interests.” 59 The
duty of loyalty is premised on the idea that directors are fiduciaries who
have a “quasi-trustee and agency relationship” to the corporation and its
stockholders. 60 In Guth v. Loft, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized:
A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a
profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has
established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director,
peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of
his duty[; he or she does this] affirmatively to protect the interests
of the corporation committed to his [or her] charge . . . . 61
The importance of focusing on the fiduciary duty of loyalty was made
clear in Aronson when the Delaware Supreme Court stated that the
protections of the business judgment rule “can only be claimed by
disinterested directors whose conduct otherwise meets the tests of business
judgment.” 62 From the standpoint of interest, Aronson held that “directors
can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to derive any
personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to
a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders
generally.” 63 Accordingly, Aronson held that “if such director interest is

59. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); see also Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d
196, 206 (Del. 2008) (stating same).
60. Schoon, 953 A.2d at 206 (citing Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1357 (Del. 1985)).
61. Id. (quoting Guth, 5 A.2d at 510).
62. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
63. Id. (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); David J.
Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int’l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430 (Del. Ch. 1968)); Cheff v. Mathes,
199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (stating that a contract
or transaction between a corporation and a director or officer, or between a corporation and
any other corporation in which one or more of its directors or officers are directors or
officers, or have a financial interest, is not void solely because of this reason, or solely
because the director or officer is present at or participates in the meeting of the board or
committee which authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because any such
director’s or officer’s votes are counted for such purpose, if: (1) the material facts as to the
director’s or officer’s relationship or interest are disclosed to or known by the authorizing
body (the board, a committee, or the shareholders), and (2) the authorizing body in good
faith authorizes the contract or transaction by a majority of the disinterested members, or (3)
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present, and the transaction is not approved by a majority consisting of the
disinterested directors, then the business judgment rule has no
application.” 64
The pronouncements in the 1984 Aronson opinion were completely
consistent with the Delaware Supreme Court’s 1983 decision the year
before in Weinberger v. UOP. 65 Weinberger is a decision about a
corporation, Signal, which was the majority shareholder of a subsidiary,
UOP. 66 Signal eliminated UOP’s minority shareholders by a cash-out
merger. 67 The antagonists in that story were directors named Charles S.
Arledge and Andrew J. Chitiea who sat on the boards of both Signal and
UOP. 68 Chitiea and Arledge did a valuation report for the benefit of the
parent, Signal. 69 That report was never disclosed to either the UOP
directors or minority shareholders prior to their approval of the merger at a
lower price. 70
Since the study was prepared by two UOP directors, Chitiea and
Arledge, using UOP information for the exclusive benefit of Signal and
nothing was done to disclose the report to the outside UOP directors or the
minority shareholders, the Delaware Supreme Court had to decide if there
was a breach of fiduciary duty.
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Weinberger by quoting the
classic language of Guth v. Loft, which the court stated required no
embellishment: “The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty
to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and
self-interest.” 71 The Delaware Supreme Court then concluded that “[g]iven
the absence of any attempt to structure this [merger] transaction on an
arm’s length basis, Signal [could not] escape the effects of the conflicts it
faced, particularly when its designees on UOP’s board [i.e., Chitiea and
Arledge] did not totally abstain from participation in the matter.” 72
In Weinberger, the Supreme Court held “[t]here is no ‘safe harbor’ for
such divided loyalties in Delaware. When directors of a Delaware
corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to
demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent

if the contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized by the
relevant body).
64. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
65. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
66. Id. at 702-03.
67. Id. at 703.
68. Id. at 705.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 707.
71. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
1939)).
72. Id.
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fairness of the bargain.” 73 The Supreme Court further held that “[t]he
requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands
on both sides of a transaction, he [or she] has the burden of establishing its
entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.” 74
In Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court also stated unequivocally
that:
There is no dilution of this obligation where one holds dual or
multiple directorships, as in a parent-subsidiary context. Thus,
individuals who act in a dual capacity as directors of two
corporations, one of whom is parent and the other subsidiary,
owe the same duty of good management to both corporations,
and in the absence of an independent negotiating structure or the
directors’ total abstention from any participation in the matter,
this duty is to be exercised in light of what is best for both
companies. 75
The Supreme Court’s reference in Weinberger to an independent
negotiating structure was highlighted in footnote 7. In that now famous
footnote, the Delaware Supreme Court stated “the result here could have
been entirely different if UOP had appointed an independent negotiating
committee of its outside directors to deal with Signal at arm’s length.” 76
For the last twenty-five years, the Delaware courts have emphasized the
importance of independent directors in safeguarding the interests of
shareholders by preserving the integrity of the corporate governance
process.
The takeover era of the 1980s gave rise to a good example. In Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed two
fundamental questions. 77 First, did the board of directors have the power
and duty to oppose a takeover threat that it reasonably perceived to be
harmful to the corporate enterprise? Second, was such action entitled to the
protection of the business judgment rule? The Supreme Court answered
both questions in the affirmative. 78 The court concluded:
When a board addresses a pending takeover bid it has an
obligation to determine whether the offer is in the best interests
of the corporation and its shareholders. In that respect a board’s
73. Id. (citing Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 57-58 (Del. 1952)).
74. Id. (citing Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952);
Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 681 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff’d, 278 A.2d 467 (Del.
1970); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int’l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968)).
75. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710-11 (internal citations omitted) (citing Levien v.
Sinclair Oil Corp., 261 A.2d 911, 915 (Del. Ch. 1969); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487,
492 (Del. 1966)).
76. Id. at 709 n.7.
77. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
78. Id. at 958.
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duty is no different from any other responsibility it shoulders, and
its decisions should be no less entitled to the respect they
otherwise would be accorded in the realm of business judgment. 79
The Delaware Supreme Court continued its analysis in Unocal by
explaining that there are “certain caveats to a proper exercise of this
function.” 80 The court stated that there is an “omnipresent specter that a
board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the
corporation and its shareholders.” 81 Therefore, “there is an enhanced duty
which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections
of the business judgment rule may be conferred” upon directors. 82
Accordingly, in Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court created a
procedural paradigm shift in Delaware corporate law. The court held that
before the business judgment rule applies to the adoption of a defensive
mechanism, the initial burden will be on the directors rather than the
shareholders. First, the “directors must show that they had reasonable
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed.” 83 Directors “satisfy that burden ‘by showing good faith and
reasonable investigation.’” 84 Second, the directors must show that the
defensive mechanism was “reasonable in relation to the threat posed.” 85
The Delaware Supreme Court explained that proof is materially enhanced
where a majority of the board favoring the proposal consisted of outside
independent directors. 86
Unocal is a significant decision for many reasons. For our purposes,
however, two are important. First, Unocal caused the procedural paradigm
shift and introduced the concept of enhanced judicial scrutiny prior to
applying the business judgment rule because of loyalty concerns. Most
importantly, those loyalty concerns were non-financial—that is, the
personal self-interest of directors who may want to entrench themselves in
office. Second, Unocal once again focused on independent directors as the
guardians of the board’s decision-making process.
Since Unocal, in other contexts, Delaware courts pay particular

79. Id. at 954; see also Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980)
(stating “[b]ecause the rule presumes that business judgment was exercised, the plaintiff
must make a showing from which a factfinder might infer that impermissible motives
predominated in the making of the decision in question,” and explaining that a plaintiff’s
claim that the directors’ motive was to retain control of the corporation is not sufficient to
rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule).
80. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 955 (citing Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del. 1964)).
84. Id. (quoting Cheff, 199 A.2d at 555).
85. Id.
86. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
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attention and give weight to decisions made by directors who are found to
be independent. This has been noted in the demand context:
In derivative litigation, before initiating an action a shareholder
must first demand that the board of directors bring suit on behalf
of the corporation. If the shareholder alleges sufficient facts to
create a reasonable doubt that the majority of the directors are
Independent, he [or she] is entitled to proceed with the litigation
without making any demand, as this would be considered futile. .
. . When a shareholder makes a [pre-suit] demand, instead of
deciding on its own whether to comply, the board may delegate
to a special committee of Independent Directors the task of
evaluating the appropriate course of action. 87
Interestingly, despite the Delaware Supreme Court’s emphasis on the
importance of independent directors, the Delaware General Corporation
statute does not refer to independent directors. 88 That statute addresses
only the “narrower concept of ‘interested directors.’” 89 Accordingly, in
Delaware, we find that the characteristics of directorial independence are
ascertained solely from judicial opinions. 90
It has frequently been noted that, although director interest and
director independence are methods of challenging a director’s loyalty, the
difference between interest and independence is significant. 91 “A director
is interested in a given transaction if she stands to gain monetarily from it
in a way that other shareholders do not.” 92 The Delaware courts have
developed independence, however, to be more encompassing than mere
financial interest. 93 Independence “examines whether a director, although
lacking in a financial self-interest, is somehow [connected] to an individual
who is interested, or whose decisions are not based on the corporate merits,
but rather are influenced by ‘personal or extraneous considerations.’” 94
In determining independence, the judicial inquiry goes beyond the
strict type of financial ties that make a director interested. 95 Instead, in
87. Daniele Marchesani, The Concept of Autonomy and the Independent Director of
Public Corporations, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 315, 321-22 (2005).
88. See Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 465
(2008) (“[I]t may be surprising to note that the Delaware General Corporation Law . . . does
not contain a single reference to independent directors.”).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 466 (citing William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism
of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents
of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 997-98 (2003)).
92. Id. (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
93. Id.
94. Rodrigues, supra note 88, at 466 (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634
A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993)).
95. Id.
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examining challenges to a director’s independence, “Delaware courts
broaden the inquiry” into the more subjective types of ties that can generate
what has been called “a sense of ‘beholdenness.’” 96 Three cases provide
illustrative examples: Martha Stewart, 97 Biondi v. Scrushy, 98 and Oracle. 99
In the Martha Stewart derivative litigation, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that independence is a fact-specific determination and that
Delaware courts must make that determination by answering two inquiries:
“independent from whom and independent for what purpose?” 100 To show
lack of independence, a shareholder-plaintiff’s complaint must raise a
reasonable doubt about a director’s independence by alleging that a director
is so “‘beholden’ to the interested director that his or her discretion would
be sterilized.” 101
In the Martha Stewart case, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court
of Chancery’s conclusion that the plaintiff must plead facts that would
support an inference that because of the nature of the relationships, the noninterested directors would risk their own reputations rather than their
relationship with the interested director. 102 In the Martha Stewart appeal,
the Delaware Supreme Court held “[a]llegations that Stewart and the other
directors moved in the same social circles, attended the same weddings,
developed business relationships before joining the board, and described
each other as ‘friends’” were insufficient, without more, to support a
reasonable inference that a majority of the Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia board was not independent. 103 The dismissal of that derivative
complaint was affirmed. 104
Biondi v. Scrushy 105 was a derivative action involving the HealthSouth
Corporation scandals.
The HealthSouth board’s special litigation
committee moved to dismiss the suit, which alleged that executives sold
shares of HealthSouth’s stock while they were in possession of material
non-public information and thereby injured the company. 106 The special
litigation committee initially consisted of two directors who were closely
tied to the CEO Richard M. Scrushy, the target of many of the allegations

96. Id.
97. Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040
(Del. 2004).
98. Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148 (Del. Ch. 2003).
99. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
100. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1049-50.
101. Id. at 1050.
102. Id. at 1052.
103. Id. at 1051.
104. Id. at 1057.
105. Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148 (Del. Ch. 2003).
106. Id. at 1149.
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made in the complaint. 107
HealthSouth Director Jon Hanson was the Chairman of the National
Football Foundation and College Hall of Fame, Inc. (“NFFCHF”) and
Director Larry D. Striplin was on NFFCHF’s board. Scrushy was also on
the NFFCHF board. “HealthSouth had been an important donor to the
NFFCHF while Hanson was its chair.” 108 In addition, “Striplin and
Scrushy had longstanding personal ties to each other and to college football
in Alabama, where one college has a Scrushy-Striplin field.” 109
Consequently, the alleged independence of the HealthSouth board’s special
litigation committee did not survive judicial scrutiny by the Court of
Chancery in light of the relationship the committee members had with the
insiders who allegedly engaged in wrongdoing. 110
Later that same year, the Court of Chancery declined to accept the
recommendation of a special litigation committee in In re Oracle Corp.
Derivative Litigation. 111 I am sure that many of you noticed that as a loyal
alumnus I am wearing a University of Pennsylvania necktie. The Oracle
litigation involved different types of ties to a different university.
In Oracle, the Court of Chancery did not question whether the
members of the special litigation committee had acted in good faith and
diligently conducted their investigation. 112 Because the independence
inquiry in the derivative litigation context asks a different question,
“whether a director is, for any substantial reason, incapable of making a
decision with only the best interests of the corporation in mind,” the Court
of Chancery held that the committee failed to satisfy the test for
independence. 113
The Oracle special litigation committee consisted of only two
members, both of whom were professors at Stanford University. The
derivative action was brought against “another Stanford professor with
professional ties to one of the committee members, a Stanford alumnus
who had directed millions of dollars in contributions to Stanford and served
on a Stanford advisory board with one of the committee members, and
Larry Ellison, the CEO, who had donated millions of dollars to
Stanford.” 114 Vice Chancellor Strine, another graduate of the Law School
107. Id. at 1156-57.
108. Paula J. Dalley, The Business Judgment Rule: What You Thought You Knew, 60
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 24, 28 (2006).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 948 (Del. Ch. 2003).
112. Id. at 947.
113. Id. at 920 (quoting Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 794 A.2d 1211,
1232 (Del. Ch. 2001), rev’d in part on other grounds, 817 A.2d 149 (Del. 2002) (internal
quotes omitted)); see also Dalley, supra note 108, at 28 (stating same).
114. Dalley, supra note 108, at 28.
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here at Penn, wrote in Oracle:
It is no easy task to decide whether to accuse a fellow director of
insider trading. For Oracle to compound that difficulty by
requiring [special litigation committee] members to consider
accusing a fellow professor and two large benefactors of their
university of conduct that is rightly considered a violation of
criminal law was unnecessary and inconsistent with the concept
of independence recognized by our law. The possibility that
these extraneous considerations biased the inquiry of the [special
litigation committee] is too substantial for this court to ignore. 115
In both Biondi and Oracle, the Court of Chancery relied upon nonpecuniary bases for finding a lack of independence and addressed the
effects that relationships, both social and professional, can have on
directors’ decision-making processes. 116 Such considerations are now
frequently raised to challenge director independence in connection with
whether demand is excused in a derivative suit or whether a board decision
should be protected by the business judgment rule. 117 The extent to which
personal relationships compromise director independence is now an
important loyalty issue that is continuing to develop in Delaware fiduciary
duty law. 118
B.

Duty of Care

I am going to return to the duty of loyalty, but before I do, I want to
review what has happened to the duty of care. To receive the business
judgment rule’s presumptive protection, directors must inform themselves
of all material information and then act with care. 119 In Delaware, the
applicable standard of care is gross negligence. 120 Interestingly, in the
1742 Sutton decision, the Lord Chancellor determined that the directors of
the Charitable Corp. had failed to monitor the corporation’s loan
procedures in making unsecured loans to directors. 121 He held the directors
liable for the resulting losses after concluding that their actions constituted
gross negligence. 122
115. Oracle, 824 A.2d at 921.
116. Dalley, supra note 108, at 29.
117. Id.
118. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d
1040, 1055 n.44 (Del. 2004) (citing the Oracle case for its procedural treatment of the issues
of independence).
119. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
120. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
121. Horsey, supra note 43, at 973 (1994) (citing Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400,
406, 26 Eng. Rep. 643, 645 (Ch. 1742)).
122. Id.

2009]

FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND LOYALTY

691

The duty of care requires that directors inform themselves of all
material information reasonably available before voting on a transaction. 123
To become informed, a board can retain consultants or other advisors and
can be protected by relying on statements, information, and reports
furnished by those advisors, if their reliance is in good faith and the
advisors were selected with reasonable care. 124
The most significant duty of care case is the 1985 decision of Smith v.
Van Gorkom. 125 The Delaware Supreme Court held that the board of Trans
Union had breached its duty of care in approving a merger. 126 Trans
Union’s Chairman and CEO, Van Gorkom, brought about the sale with the
help of another inside director, Bruce Chelberg. 127 The remainder of the
board was not informed of the proposal until the day before the buyer’s
deadline to accept it. 128 The board approved the sale based on a twentyminute presentation by Van Gorkom, supported by Chelberg, as well as the
advice of Trans Union’s legal counsel and the directors’ “knowledge of the
market history of the Company’s stock.” 129
The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that Trans Union’s board
was not entitled to the presumption of the business judgment rule because
the board had failed to act on an informed basis. 130 After finding that the
Trans Union directors had breached their duty of care in approving the sale
of the corporation, the Delaware Supreme Court took “the unprecedented
step” of holding all of Trans Union’s directors jointly and severally liable
for more than $23 million. 131
The Van Gorkom decision caused concern—some have called it
panic—in the board rooms of Delaware corporations throughout the United
States, because directors feared for their own personal liability. In 1986,
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law was enacted
by the Delaware Assembly. 132 That enactment was in response to the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Van Gorkom and followed a
directors’ insurance liability crisis. 133
123. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (quoting Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124
(Del. Ch. 1971)).
124. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2008); Grossman, supra note 33, at 402.
125. 488 A.2d 858; Grossman, supra note 33, at 402.
126. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
127. Id. at 868.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 869.
130. Id. at 893.
131. Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate Directors?, 93
IOWA L. REV. 929, 935 (2008).
132. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2008) (enacted 1986).
133. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001) (“[A]s a matter of the
public policy of this State, Section 102(b)(7) was adopted by the Delaware General
Assembly in 1986 following a directors and officers insurance liability crisis and the 1985

692

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:3

The Delaware Supreme Court explained in Emerald Partners v. Berlin
that:
[t]he purpose of Section 102(b)(7) was to permit shareholders—
who are entitled to rely upon directors to discharge their fiduciary
duties at all times—to adopt a provision in the certificate of
incorporation to exculpate directors from any personal liability
for the payment of monetary damages for breaches of their duty
of care, but not for duty of loyalty violations, good faith
violations and certain other conduct. 134
After section 102(b)(7) was enacted, the shareholders of almost all
Delaware corporations approved charter amendments containing these
exculpatory provisions with full knowledge of their import—that directors
would not have to pay money damages for duty of care violations, i.e.,
gross negligence. 135
“Since its enactment, Delaware courts have
consistently held that the adoption of a charter provision, in accordance
with section 102(b)(7), bars the recovery of monetary damages from
directors for a successful shareholder claim that is based exclusively upon
establishing a violation of the duty of care.” 136
In Malpiede v. Townson, the Delaware Supreme Court was asked to
decide if a shareholder complaint that asserts only a due care claim is
dismissible once the corporation’s section 102(b)(7) provision is properly
invoked. 137 The court’s answer was yes, even though a care violation
would rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule and require the
board to prove entire fairness. 138
The rationale of Malpiede constitutes judicial cognizance of a
practical reality: unless there is a violation of the duty of loyalty or the
obligation to act in good faith, a trial on the issue of entire fairness is
unnecessary, because a section 102(b)(7) provision will exculpate director
defendants from paying monetary damages if the failure to demonstrate
entire fairness is exclusively attributable to a violation of the duty of
care. 139 Since almost all Delaware corporations have adopted 102(b)(7)
provisions, monetary damages cannot be recovered even if a violation of
the duty of care is established. “This has led several commentators to
conclude that the fiduciary duty of care exists only as an aspirational and

Delaware Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom.”).
134. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 91.
137. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001).
138. Id. at 1094.
139. Id. at 1094-95; Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223-24 (Del. 1999)
(discussing the liability shield provided under the certificate of incorporation provision
pursuant to 102(b)(7)).
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unenforceable standard,” 140 except in actions for injunctive relief, or as a
means for Delaware courts to “shame” directors who are grossly negligent
and thereby inspire other directors not to repeat those same careless
mistakes. 141
III. COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING LOYALTY
The effect of the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in Malpiede is
that the duty of care is no longer a litigation focus in actions for damages
against the directors of Delaware corporations that have a section 102(b)(7)
charter provision. Instead, shareholders’ complaints now attempt to allege
facts that, if true, constitute breaches of loyalty or good faith. Let me give
two examples that were explained in Malpiede.
In Malpiede, the Supreme Court distinguished McMullin v. Beran. 142
In McMullin, the majority of a subsidiary’s board had ties to the parent
corporation and was alleged to have influenced a hasty sale that was critical
to the parent’s cash flow needs. 143 The Supreme Court explained that the
complaint in McMullin survived a motion to dismiss, even though the
corporation had a 102(b)(7) provision, because the shareholder complaint
in McMullin alleged facts that, if true, described a duty of care violation
that could be attributed to the subsidiary board of directors’ divided
loyalties. 144
The Malpiede decision also discussed complaints that alleged director
violations of their duty of disclosure. 145 The directors’ duty of disclosure is
not an independent duty but the application in a specific context of the
board’s fiduciary duties of care, good faith and loyalty. 146 The duty of
disclosure requires directors to fully and fairly disclose all material
information within the board’s control when it seeks shareholder action. 147
In Malpiede, the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding in Arnold
v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc. that disclosure violations that are only
attributable to a failure to exercise care are protected by 102(b)(7). 148

140. Grossman, supra note 33, at 403.
141. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1811 (2001) (discussing the growing prevalence of opinions written to “shame” offenders).
142. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000).
143. Id. at 915-16.
144. Malpiede, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093.
145. Id. at 1085-89.
146. Id. at 1086 (citing Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del.
1995)).
147. Id. (citing Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84-85 (Del. 1992)); see also Grossman,
supra note 33, at 408.
148. Malpiede, 780 A.2d 1075, 1086; Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d
1270, 1287 (Del. 1994); see also Grossman, supra note 33, at 408.
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Therefore, unless a complaint relates a disclosure violation to a breach of
loyalty, it will be dismissed after Malpiede.
A.

Care and Good Faith

The holding in Malpiede explains why shareholder complaints have
moved away from alleging care violations only and now focus on the duty
of loyalty and good faith. Once again, I will postpone my return to the duty
of loyalty to briefly address directors’ fiduciary responsibility to act in
good faith.
In several cases in the 1990s, the Delaware Supreme Court began
referring to directors’ fiduciary duties as a “triad”: care, loyalty, and good
faith. 149 Those cases suggested or implied that good faith was an
independent fiduciary duty. Increasingly, shareholder-plaintiffs seeking
monetary damages alleged that directors did not act in good faith because,
like loyalty, it was another way to get around the exculpation of section
102(b)(7) provisions.
The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation 150 involved a controversy
about “the hiring and firing of Michael Ovitz as Disney’s president.” 151 In
October 1995, Michael Ovitz and Disney entered into an employment
agreement under which Ovitz would serve as Disney’s president for five
years. 152 Disney terminated Ovitz a little more than a year later in
December 1996. 153 Despite Ovitz’s short tenure, under the terms of the
employment agreement he received a severance package valued at
approximately $130 million. 154
In a derivative complaint, the shareholder-plaintiffs:
alleged that the compensation committee of the Disney board,
and the board itself, had failed to adequately consider the
employment, compensation, and termination of Michael Ovitz as
President of Disney in 1995-1996. According to the complaint,
the board and committee had considered Ovitz’s employment and
compensation only briefly and had failed to act in his termination

149. See Bishop, supra note 51, at 742 (describing modern day fiduciary duties as the
triad of good faith, care, and loyalty); see, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90
(Del. 2001) (“The directors of Delaware corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary
duties: due care, loyalty, and good faith.” (citing Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10
(1998))).
150. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
151. Kay Xixi Ng, Inside the Boardroom: A Proposal to Delaware’s Good Faith
Jurisprudence to Improve Board Passivity, 6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 393, 406 (2008).
152. Disney, 906 A.2d at 41.
153. Id. at 45-46.
154. Id. at 35; see also Ng, supra note 151, at 406 (describing Ovitz’s severance
package).
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at all. 155
The Disney complaint used lack of good faith to rebut not only the
presumptions of the business judgment rule, but also the application of a
section 102(b)(7) exculpatory charter provision. 156 In denying a motion to
dismiss the complaint, the Court of Chancery “held that the plaintiff had
alleged sufficient facts to raise a ‘reason to doubt whether the board’s
actions were taken honestly and in good faith,’ as required for the
application of the business judgment rule,” and if those allegations were
true, “the directors were not entitled to the protection of the exculpatory
clause in Disney’s charter.” 157
When the trial in Disney concluded, “the Chancellor ruled in favor of
the Board.” 158 Nevertheless, the Disney case, like Van Gorkom, created
“considerable consternation” with corporate board rooms because it
permitted a claim of bad faith, i.e., lack of good faith, to survive a motion
to dismiss and to go forward in a trial against the Disney directors. 159
In challenging the board actions that led to Ovitz’s brief but lucrative
tenure at Disney, the plaintiffs contended that gross negligence (care) was
on a continuum and that at some point, a board’s lack of care could become
so egregious that it constituted bad faith. 160 The Delaware Supreme Court
rejected that contention and held that a failure to act in good faith requires
conduct that is qualitatively different from, and more culpable than, the
conduct giving rise to a violation of the fiduciary duty of care (gross
negligence). 161
In the Disney decision, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that
from a legal standpoint, directors’ duties of care and good faith are
distinct. 162 The Court noted that Delaware’s legislative history and its
common law jurisprudence draw clear distinctions between the duties to
exercise due care and to act in good faith. 163 It also noted that highly
significant legal consequences result from that distinction. 164
In particular, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that the
Delaware General Assembly had addressed the difference between bad
faith and a failure to exercise due care in two separate statutory contexts. 165
155. Dalley, supra note 108, at 27.
156. Id.
157. Id. (quoting In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del.
Ch. 2003)).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 28.
160. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64-65 (Del. 2006).
161. Id. at 66.
162. Id. at 65.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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“The first is Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL,” 166 which has already been
discussed. As I have emphasized, that statute authorizes Delaware
corporations, through a provision in the certificate of incorporation, to
exculpate their directors from monetary damage liability for a breach of the
duty of care. 167 Section 102(b)(7) has several exceptions, however,
including most relevantly, “for acts or omissions not in good faith.” 168
Thus, as we know, a corporation can exculpate its directors from monetary
liability for a breach of the duty of care, but not for conduct that is not in
good faith.
“A second legislative recognition of the distinction between fiduciary
conduct that is grossly negligent and conduct that is not in good faith, is
Delaware’s indemnification statute,” which is found in section 145 of the
Delaware General Corporate Law. 169 Under section 145, a director or
officer of a corporation can be indemnified for liability (and litigation
expenses) incurred by reason of a violation of the duty of care, but not for a
violation of the duty to act in good faith. 170
The Delaware Supreme Court decision in Disney provided important
future guidance for directors of Delaware corporations by identifying three
examples of conduct that would establish a failure to act in good faith:
first, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of
advancing the best interests of the corporation; second, where the fiduciary
acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law; and third, where the
fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act,
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his or her duties. 171
B.

Loyalty and Good Faith

In Shakespeare’s play King Henry VI, Part 2, the King asks, “O,
where is faith? O, where is loyalty?” 172 A few months after explaining the
distinction between care and good faith in Disney, the Delaware Supreme
Court addressed the relationship between the directors’ duty of loyalty and
good faith. In doing so, the Supreme Court answered the King’s question
when it decided Stone v. Ritter. 173 That clarification came in the context of
deciding directors’ oversight responsibilities.

166. Disney, 906 A.2d at 65.
167. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2008).
168. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2008).
169. Disney, 906 A.2d at 65; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2008).
170. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145; see also Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204,
211-13 (Del. 2005) (discussing the right to indemnification under section 145).
171. Disney, 906 A.2d at 67.
172. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 5, sc. 1.
173. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
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Stone was a derivative action. 174 In 2004, AmSouth and AmSouth
Bank paid $40 million in fines and $10 million in civil penalties to resolve
regulatory and government investigations relating to the failure by bank
employees to file suspicious activity reports that were required by the
federal Bank Secrecy Act and several anti-money laundering regulations. 175
The complaint in Stone alleged that the directors breached their fiduciary
duties by not properly discharging their oversight responsibilities. 176
The issue of directors’ fiduciary obligations in exercising oversight
responsibility was initially addressed by the Court of Chancery over a
decade earlier in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation. 177
Because the Caremark case was not appealed, however, the subject had not
been addressed by the Delaware Supreme Court. In Caremark, the Court
of Chancery held:
Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss
is predicated upon ignorance of liability creating activities within
the corporation . . . only a sustained or systematic failure of the
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to
assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists—
will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition
to liability. 178
In Stone, consistent with its opinion Disney, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that Caremark articulates the two “necessary conditions for
assessing director oversight liability”: 179 (1) the directors utterly failed to
implement any reporting or information system or controls or (2) having
implemented such a system or controls, the directors consciously failed to
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention. 180
In Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “[w]here directors fail
to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a conscious
disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by
failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith.” 181 That holding
required the Delaware Supreme Court “to clarify a doctrinal issue that was
critical to understanding fiduciary liability” under the Caremark
standard. 182
The Delaware Supreme Court explained that the terminology used in
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 364.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 364.
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Id. at 971.
Stone, 911 A.2d at 365.
Id. at 370.
Id.
Id. at 369.
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Caremark and in Stone—which described the lack of good faith as a
“necessary condition to liability”—was intentional. 183 The purpose of that
phraseology was “to communicate that a failure to act in good faith is not
conduct that results . . . in the direct imposition of fiduciary liability.”184
In Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court further explained that “[t]he
failure to act in good faith may result in liability because the requirement to
act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary element,’ i.e., a condition, ‘of the
fundamental duty of loyalty.’” 185 Because a showing of bad faith conduct,
as described in Disney and Caremark, is essential to establish director
oversight liability, it followed that the fiduciary duty violated by that
conduct is the duty of loyalty. 186
Stone’s explanation of what constitutes a failure to act in good faith
resulted in two doctrinal consequences. 187 The first consequence was that,
“although good faith may be described colloquially as part of a ‘triad’ of
fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty, the obligation
to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that
stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty.” 188 Only
directors’ violation of the latter two duties may directly result in liability,
whereas a failure to act in good faith may result in liability, but
indirectly. 189
The second doctrinal consequence was a recognition that “the
fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or
other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest.” 190 The duty of loyalty also
includes cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith. 191 The
Delaware Supreme Court reiterated in Stone what the Court of Chancery
had stated in Guttman v. Huang: “A director cannot act loyally towards the
corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that her actions are in
the corporation’s best interest.” 192
In Stone, the plaintiffs’ complaint equated a bad outcome with bad
faith. 193 The problem with the plaintiffs’ argument in Stone was “a failure
to recognize that the directors’ good faith exercise of oversight
responsibility may not invariably prevent employees from violating

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369-70 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34
(Del. Ch. 2003)).
186. Id. at 370.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
192. Id. (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
193. Id. at 373.
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criminal laws, or from causing the corporation to incur significant financial
liability.” 194 In fact, both of these unfortunate acts had also occurred in
Graham and Caremark. 195
You will recall that in the 1742 Sutton decision, the Lord Chancellor
stated that “it is by no means just in a judge, after bad consequences have
arisen from [any exercise of] power, to say [the fiduciary] foresaw at the
time what [would] happen, and therefore [was] guilty of a breach of
trust.” 196
In Stone in 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “in the
absence of red flags, good faith in the context of oversight must be
measured by the directors’ actions ‘to assure a reasonable information and
reporting system exists’ and not by second-guessing after the occurrence of
employee conduct that results in an unintended adverse outcome.” 197 The
current financial crisis creates a perfect storm for examination by the
Institute for Law and Economics with experts from the Law School, the
Department of Economics, and the Wharton School. Undoubtedly, that
cross-disciplinary analysis will be looking for red flags that were missed
from all three perspectives.
The Stone decision brings us back to the duty of loyalty today. After
the Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions in Stone and Disney, it is now
clear that fiduciary misconduct that implicates the duty of loyalty includes
not only “disloyalty in the classic sense (i.e., preferring the adverse selfinterest of the fiduciary or of a related person to the interests of the
corporation),” 198 but also bad faith (i.e., “intentional dereliction of duty or
conscious disregard of one’s responsibilities” 199 or “fiduciary conduct
motivated by actual intent to do harm” 200 ).
The other Delaware cases I have discussed also lead to another
conclusion. The business judgment rule ensures that courts will respect the
business decisions of directors unless the directors: (1) were interested in
the decision; 201 (2) lacked independence to objectively evaluate the merits
of the decision; 202 (3) failed to act in good faith in making the decision; 203
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 405, 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 644 (Ch. 1742).
197. Stone, 911 A.2d at 373 (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698
A.2d 959, 967-68, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)).
198. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006).
199. Id. at 64.
200. Id. at 66.
201. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (holding that where
the directors are interested in the transaction, they have the burden of showing utmost good
faith and the fairness of the bargain).
202. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(holding that the Board’s special litigation committee failed the test of independence);
Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding that the HealthSouth board’s
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or (4) otherwise acted in a manner not attributable to any rational business
purpose or that constituted gross negligence. 204
Most corporations, however, have a charter provision, authorized
under section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which
eliminates or limits directors’ personal liability to the corporation and its
stockholders for money damages for a breach of the fiduciary duty of
care. 205 Therefore, plaintiffs must allege and prove a breach of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty, which now includes the obligation of good faith,
in order for the court to hold the directors personally liable. 206
Consequently, stockholder plaintiffs must bring an action premised on the
theory that the director defendants “breached their duty of loyalty by
engaging in intentional, bad faith, or self-interested conduct that is not
immunized by the exculpatory charter provision” permitted by section
102(b)(7). 207
IV. CONCLUSION
As you can see from my remarks this afternoon, Professor Rock was
exactly right in three respects. First, Delaware fiduciary duty law is best
understood as “a set of parables” about good and bad directors. 208 Second,
Delaware judicial opinions over time yield reasonably determinative,
normative guidelines for directors. 209 And third, therefore, Delaware’s
fiduciary duty law is not mushy or blurred. 210 In fact, with my remarks I
have tried to suggest to you that the focus of Delaware’s fiduciary duty law
is sharp and that focus is on loyalty.
In the 1742 Sutton decision, the Lord Chancellor held that directors
special litigation committee was not independent where committee members had a
relationship with the insiders allegedly engaged in the wrongdoing).
203. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (requiring a good faith effort to
ensure effective reporting systems are in place in the absence of red flags).
204. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (setting the applicable
standard of care as gross negligence); see also In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 2008 WL
4053221, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 2, 2008) (“[D]irectors' decisions will be respected by courts
unless the directors . . . act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business
purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process . . . ." (quoting Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000))).
205. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2008).
206. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 367 (discussing the burden of the plaintiff in a derivative
action).
207. McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 495 (Del. Ch. 2000); see also
Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1094 (Del. 2001) (explaining what the plaintiffs must
plead in order to support a claim that is not barred by the 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision).
208. See Rock, supra note 8, at 1016 (discussing the Delaware opinions in the context of
parables of good and bad managers in conjuction with good and bad lawyers).
209. See id. at 1017.
210. See id. at 1101.
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had a fiduciary duty of fidelity. 211 Fidelity is derived from the Latin word
fidelis, meaning loyal or faithful. 212
Today is Veteran’s Day. We honor the memory of the brave men and
women who fought for our freedom. In reflecting on Veteran’s Day, I was
reminded of the motto of the United States Marine Corps: Semper Fidelis,
always loyal. That is a good motto for the directors of Delaware
corporations—always be loyal—and that is the moral of my story today.

211. Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 406, 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 645 (Ch. 1742).
212. MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 465 (11th ed. 2003).

